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Abstract 
 
In the next fifty years, according to the United Nations Population Prospect 
(2004), an ageing population is expected in Vietnam. The operation of a 
pay-as-you-go defined benefit pension scheme will inevitably elevate 
pension liabilities. These liabilities, in turn, threaten the financial sustainability 
of the scheme, and affect generational relations.   
This paper estimates the size of pension liabilities of the current pension 
scheme in Vietnam, and analyzes generational relations under various 
economic scenarios. Pension liabilities are considered by a closed-group 
approach. The estimated results show that pension liabilities account for a 
small part of 2002 GDP, and this is partially explained by two primary factors: 
(i) the method of estimation currently employed by the scheme, and (ii) the 
fact that currently the scheme covers only a small portion of the total 
population and labour force. It is, however, obvious that the government 
will have to pay existing pension liabilities, which will affect generational 
relations in the longer term, particularly from an economic point of view. 
Whether the impacts on generational relations will be serious or not 
depends upon payment settings and reforms of the scheme.   
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“The extent of intergenerational transfers is related to the financial systems in use. 
The PAYG system is the one that leads to the majority of such transfers” 
Plamondon et al. (2002), p.33 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Populations are now ageing rapidly not only in the developed countries, 
but in the highly-performing developing ones. This demographic trend is placing 
high pressures on social security schemes, since their financial sustainability 
depends heavily on the labour of future generations. There has also been a 
widespread recognition that the financial viability of the most common public 
pension scheme, i.e. pay-as-you-go defined benefit (PAYG DB), will deteriorate 
in an aging society since it is unfunded. Further, it is also well known that PAYG 
DB schemes also lead both to intergenerational and intra-generational inequity 
with different economic levels (see, for example, World Bank 1994, Kunieda 
2002). Thus, governments in countries with such pension schemes are seeking 
ways to reform their social security systems. 
 
Among the various factors that need to be considered, the size of pension 
liabilities is the most important indicator, both of financial and generation-
related deficiency. On the one hand, these liabilities are measured by the 
present values of pension rights to different generations in the pension scheme, 
but they are not recorded in the national balance sheet or elsewhere, where 
they are accumulating implicit liabilities for the government. Reforms, which 
would alter the current system from an unfunded to a funded scheme, will make 
these debts explicit. This, in turn, will impact negatively on inter-temporal budget 
balances, particularly in the context of the increasingly competitive economic 
environment of rapid globalization. On the other hand, financial problems 
become more severe when a PAYG DB scheme is operating in a dynamically 
efficient economy because contributors have to pay more heavily to cover 
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increasing costs of the scheme. “Generational battles” then become 
unavoidable.   
 
Although Vietnam is still a young economy with about 9 percent of its total 
population aged 60 and over, and a median age of 24.9  (UN, 2004), it will face 
the same problems of ageing as other countries in the future. Recent 
demographic changes show that life expectancy at birth increased from 64.8 in 
1990 to 70.3 in 2004, and fertility rates declined substantially from 3.4 children per 
woman in 1990 to 1.9 in 2004. UN population projections (2004) indicate that 
these trends will be changing dramatically in the next fifty years. For instance, 
the elderly population will increase significantly, reaching 25.5 percent in 2050, 
while the child population will increase at a slower pace. The demographic 
dependency ratio will be driven mostly by the elderly dependency ratio (Figure 
1).  
Figure 1. Dependency Ratios for Vietnamese Population, 1950-2050 
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Source: Author compiled from UN Population Prospects (2004) 
 
Furthermore, the current publicly-managed PAYG DB scheme in Vietnam is 
inherently fragile in terms of its financial stability, due to limited coverage: low 
contributions are associated with relatively high replacement rates, and with 
increasing rates of maturation. Several reports foresee the deterioration of the 
scheme if no policy measures are taken (ILO 1998, Holzmann, Arthur, and Sinn 
2000, and Giang 2004b). The crisis is imminent, so that policy options sustaining 
the scheme need to be addressed urgently. 
 
This paper proposes to measure the size of liabilities facing Vietnam’s 
pension scheme, and to evaluate the economic implications of this measure for 
generational relations. Section 2 reviews literatures on pension reform in both 
developed and developing countries. An analytical framework, an appropriate 
dataset, and projection assumptions, are presented in Section 3. Estimated 
results using status-quo projections, and inclusive of sensitivity tests and policy 
implications, are presented in Section 4. Concluding remarks are given in 
Section 5.   
 
2. An Overview of Literature 
 
Even though the idea of pension liabilities is straightforward, the subject is 
often still confusing to researchers since there are numerous definitions and 
measures of pension liabilities for the several types of pension scheme, and 
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these are used for various evaluation purposes1. In the context of PAYG pension 
schemes, studies have focused on three popular types: (i) the accrued-to-date 
approach, which describes the present value of future pensions to be paid on 
the basis of accrued rights, with future contributions of current contributors and 
the accrual of new entrants not considered; (ii) the closed-group approach, 
which estimates present pension liabilities to current pensioners and contributors 
by assuming that the pension scheme exists until the youngest contributor dies, 
with no new entrants; and (iii) the open-system approach, which measures the 
present value of liabilities to current pensioners, current contributors, and people 
who have not yet entered the labour market (including children and the not-
yet-born population). 
 
This Section aims to review a number of approaches in the literature to see 
how the size of pension liabilities is estimated, both in developed and 
developing countries, and what policy options should be selected to mitigate 
these liabilities and to achieve a just generational balance. The papers using 
closed-group approaches are the main focus of attention. For critical 
comments on estimation methods and policy implications in this literature, the 
paper by Franco, Marino, and Zotteri (2004) is especially helpful.    
 
The earliest comparative study of the impact of ageing on public pension 
liabilities, conducted in four OECD countries (Germany, Japan, Sweden, and 
the United States), was carried out by Hagemann and Nicoletti (1989). The 
authors measured unfunded public pension obligations by a closed-group 
approach, and their estimate showed obligations as percentage of 1985 GDP. 
The figures for the US, Japan, Germany, and Sweden, were respectively 158, 
217, 355, and 183 percent2. Regarding the rapid ageing of populations in these 
countries, the paper indicated that trends would give rise to intergenerational 
equity problems since estimates indicated that returns to more recently born 
cohorts were likely to be much lower than those to older cohorts (ibid., p. 22). To 
                  
1 For detailed discussions, see Holzmann, Palacios and Zviniene (2001, 2004). 
2 The estimates include only men and women with pension rights, and exclude benefits of 
dependent spouses, survivors and disability payments. The estimated result for Sweden refers to 
unindexed pension units. 
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avoid these problems, the paper proposed alternative policy options such as 
accumulating funds that would balance revenues and expenditures, raising the 
retirement age, and reducing benefits. These options would obviously need to 
be implemented with careful consideration. For instance, under the first option, 
a government could set periodically adjusted contribution rates in excess of 
PAYG requirements so as to accumulate capital; contribution rates would 
otherwise increase swiftly during the projection period (for example, from 3.85 
percent in 1987 to 22.95 percent in 2050 in the case of Japan).      
 
Kane and Palacios (1996) discussed various aspects of pension debt in 
PAYG public pension schemes. Their estimates again used a closed-group 
approach, applied to several countries in different continents. Their estimates 
indicate that the size of debt varies across countries, and seems to be higher 
where countries are both heavily committed to PAYG public pension schemes 
and are experiencing rapid demographic change. Comparison of projected 
pension costs with GDP, for example in the early 1990s, revealed that the most 
serious cases were Uruguay and Croatia, with levels at 214 and 350 per cent 
respectively.  Levels were also high in Brazil, with 187 percent, and China, with 63 
percent. According to the authors, pension debt was a fiscal burden that could 
not be ignored in low- and middle-income countries, particularly in regard to the 
long-term imbalance of the pension scheme, which would very likely require 
massive intergenerational transfers when the population became older. 
Standardization of pension debt estimates, in their view, serves as an accurate 
long-term fiscal indicator, helping to compare countries over time more 
appropriately. 
 
Holzmann, Palacios, and Zviniene (2001, 2004) also apply a unified 
methodology and assumptions to this issue, comparing estimates for 26 
countries in the former study, and 35 countries in the latter study3. Applying the 
closed-group approach, the authors estimate debts in various years during the 
late 1990s and 2000 with discount rates of 2, 4, and 5 per cent. Their estimates 
                  
3 Nine countries were added in the latter, i.e. Iran, Bolivia, Mexico, Colombia, Dominican 
Republic, Cape Verde, Chile, El Salvador, and Peru. 
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vary between countries, and indicate that countries with swift demographic 
transitions and a long history of PAYG pension schemes will face the most serious 
problems. For instance, with a 5 per cent discount rate, the estimates in the 
former study ranged from 26 per cent of GDP in Morocco to 275 per cent of 
GDP in Brazil; in the latter study, indicative figures are Iran (72 per cent), Mexico 
(54 per cent), and Peru (34 per cent). These rough results indicate that liabilities 
need to be identified since they influence the macro-economy significantly via 
many channels.  An index of liabilities is clearly an important indicator of the 
need to reform a pension scheme to achieve long-term financial sustainability, 
particularly where an ageing population is likely to lead to faster maturation of 
the schemes. 
 
Finally, Bravo and Uthoff (1999) use a closed-group approach in estimating 
pension debt for 20 countries in Latin America. Their results are calibrated, the 
discount rate being equal to wage growth rate, indicating that the liabilities are 
severe, even in countries with young populations and low coverage rates, such 
as the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Honduras (1999:10). The estimated 
size of debt, as a percentage of 1990 GDP, ranged from 4.3 in Haiti to 305.4 in 
Argentina, and on average it was several times greater than the official debt. In 
order to assess the impact of demographic factors, the authors applied 
population structures to the several countries, instead of to Latin America as a 
whole.  The results show that old-age mortality had a small effect on the size of 
debt, but population structure, particularly a highly aged population, did have 
significant impact. Sensitivity tests, assuming a 4 per cent economic growth rate 
and varying discount rates  over a 40-year period, showed that fiscal costs of 
pension debt seemed “manageable” for low- and very low-debt groups, but 
were still high or very high in other countries. To deal with the problem, the 
paper recommends a partial shift to funded or notional defined-contribution 
(NDC) schemes, changes in benefits and eligibility conditions, and adoption of 
an inter-temporal budget approach to reduce financial shocks. 
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In Vietnam, to the best of my knowledge, there have been few studies on 
pension liabilities of the current PAYG DB pension scheme, with most of them 
focused on the financial sustainability of the scheme with open-system 
projections. The International Labour Office (1998), employing actuarial models, 
measured the financial capability of the social insurance scheme, including 
pensions. Although it did not focus directly on estimating pension debt, the 
cash-flow results for the period 1996-2040 indicated that the current scheme 
would accumulate significant debt in comparison with 1996 GDP. Projections 
showed that the total contribution rate required to balance the scheme might 
increase to more than 35 percent by 2040, compared with 20 percent at 
present (1998:42). The report suggested several parametric reforms needed to 
achieve financial viability, such as cutting benefits, revising the pension formula 
by employing regular adjustments, and increasing the retirement age for 
females to 60. In terms of generational equity, it was suggested that the scheme 
carefully reconsider early retirement and disability benefits, since these entail 
costly provision and a high dependency burden for working participants. 
 
Vietnam Social Insurance (2004), also by means of actuarial models, 
estimated that the social insurance fund would be depleted in 2032 if it was 
kept the same. Nguyen (2004) also pointed to the threat of generational 
inequity by indicating that a person with a 30-year contribution would receive 
his/her benefits in only 6-8 years, while the average number of years to receive 
benefits was estimated at 15 years (2004:8).  
 
In a previous paper (Giang, 2004b), I estimated pension debt for Vietnam’s 
pension scheme during the long period 2000-2050 by using an open-system 
approach. This indicates that pension debt will rise in comparison with 2000 GDP, 
the contribution rate increasing to 26.5 percent in 2050 if financial balance is to 
be achieved. Without such increases, the scheme will collapse in 2035. The 
paper suggests as policy options that the scheme move to a partially funded 
defined-contribution scheme with sound governance and an explicit regulatory 
framework. 
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3. Analytical Framework, Dataset, and Assumptions 
 
3.1. Analytical Framework 
 
In this paper, pension liabilities will be estimated using the closed-group 
approach, by applying the estimation methods of Franco, Marino, and Zotteri 
(2004). These assume initially that disability and survivor pensions, and the 
practice of using different rules for males and females, are not considered. 
These assumptions of course need to be modified as the analysis proceeds. To 
begin with, it is simply assumed that the current pension scheme in Vietnam will 
continue until 2077 when the youngest contributor in the year 2002 dies 
(assuming he or she was 15 years old in 2002). There are no new entrants to the 
scheme. The different characteristics of pre- and post-1995 schemes4, which 
include variations in benefit levels and replacement rates, require four 
components to be estimated: (i) pension liabilities to pre-1995 pensioners; (ii) 
pension liabilities to post-1995 pensioners; (iii) net pension liabilities to pre-1995 
contributors; and (iv) net pension liabilities to post-1995 contributors.  
 
a. Pension Liabilities of Current Pensioners 
 
Suppose that, in the year 2002, Nj is the number of pensioners of age j, each 
of whom receives Bj as their average pension, and that their survivorship 
probability is Sj. Pension liabilities for these people in the year 2002 may then be 
expressed by the equation: 
                                                             
(1)    jjjj BSNP =)2002(  
                                               
                  
4 See Giang (2004b & 2005) for detailed descriptions of the pension scheme in Vietnam and 
debates surrounding it. 
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If we assume that these people may live until D years of age, which is the 
maximum age of the population, then their pension liabilities during (D-j) years 
will be: 
 
(2)            ∑∑ −+
=
−+
=
==
jD
i
ijjj
jD
i
ijjjj SBNSNBP
2002
2002
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2002
2002
,                                     
       
where Sj,i is the probability that the person of age j will be alive in year i. 
Moreover, by assuming that p is the constant growth rate of a pension, that 
−
j  is 
the minimum age of pensioners, and that r is the discount rate, we can 
calculate the present value of pension liabilities to these people in 2002 as 
follows: 
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Equation (3) can be applied to estimate pension liabilities to both pre-1995 and 
post-1995 pensioners in Vietnam. 
 
b. Net Pension Liabilities of the Current Contributors 
 
These estimates are more complicated than those just outlined, since we 
have to consider both accrued contributions and benefits up to the year 2002, 
as well as future contributions and benefits from 2002 onwards. A number of 
further variables are required: cjN  is the number of active contributors of age j in 
the year 2002; cjB  is the average pension paid at retirement to the contributors 
of age j in the year 2002 measured as contributions already paid (in other words, 
accrued-to-date contributions); ijQ ,  is the probability of receiving a pension at 
year i for active contributors of age j in the year 2002; c ijS ,  is the probability of 
being alive in the year i for a contributor of age j in the year 2002; cjPF  is the 
average pension paid at retirement to contributors of age j in the year 2002 
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measured on the basis of future contributions; C is the contribution rate 
according to labour income in the year i for the contributor of age j in the year 
2002 (i.e. jiFI , ); and jiR ,  is the probability of being in employment in year i for 
contributors of age j in the year 2002.  The total present value of pension 
liabilities to current contributors is then calculated as follows:  
 
(4)    =+= )2002(2)2002(1)2002( jjj PVCPVCPVC    
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where PVCj(2002) is the present value of net pension liabilities to the current 
contributors. This calculation includes the present value of accrued-to-date 
liabilities (i.e. PVCj1(2002)) and the present value of future liabilities in respect of 
future contributions (i.e. PVCj2(2002)).  
 
For each generation, the present value of (net) pension liabilities may be 
taken to represent its generational account. A positive value of this account 
indicates that the generation receives transfers from other ones, and vice versa. 
In the case of the pension scheme in Vietnam, we may expect that current 
pensioners will have positive accounts since they are pure beneficiaries; the 
question of whether current contributors will have positive or negative accounts 
is less certain, since the answer depends heavily upon projections of future 
contributions and benefits. To reach generational equity, the proposed policies 
need to focus carefully on these accounts. 
 
In addition to status-quo projections, this paper also considers some 
additional scenarios which take into account mortality rates, an increase in the 
timing of women’s  retirement to age 60, an increase in contribution rates, and a 
reduction of replacement rates. 
3.2. Dataset and Assumptions 
 
The dataset includes the number of pensioners and contributors of both 
pre- and post-1995 schemes. These people are categorized by sex and 5-year 
age cohorts. Figures 1.1-1.4 in Appendix 1 indicate the age distribution of 
pensioners and active contributors in the year 2002, which is the base year for 
projections. It is obvious that the number of pre- and post-1995 pensioners will 
decline over time. In the absence of a life table for pensioners, estimations 
assume that mortality rates will follow those indicated in the life table for the 
Vietnamese population of 1999 (Lopez et al. 2000) (see Appendix 2). Average 
benefits in each age group are assumed to grow at the same rate as active 
contributors’ wages. This is indicated by p in equation (3), which will be 
discussed in detail later. 
 
A further problem is that benefits of dependants or survivors (e.g. children, 
spouses, or parents) will entail lump-sum or monthly payments. It is infeasible, 
however, to estimate these benefits since there are many reasons why 
beneficiaries may terminate the schemes. For the present purposes, these 
payments are assumed to represent about 10 percent of total pension benefits 
in each period, meaning that 10 per cent of pension liabilities are due to 
benefits for dependants or survivors5. 
 
The projection of future benefits and contributions for both pre- and post-
1995 active contributors is clearly a very complicated task. For the sake of 
simplicity, the projections developed here will begin from three initial 
assumptions: (i) benefit and contribution data may be grouped into 5-year 
periods, with  no policy changes during each period; (ii) the early or late 
retirement of contributors is not considered; and (iii) there are no differences in 
average wage rates among contributors belonging to public and private 
sectors. These assumptions are admittedly “heroic”, since various policy 
                  
5 The data show that, during 1995-2002, total benefits to dependants or survivors fluctuated 
around 9.88 per cent at least, and 10.22 percent at most, of the total pension benefits. 
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changes will inevitably be required to adapt to rapid changes in the transitional 
economy of Vietnam, and these changes will in turn influence working and 
retirement decisions of contributors. 
 
To estimate the number of contributors and pensioners in the future, it is also 
assumed that there are three probabilities for a contributor in successive 
periods. He or she:  (i)  will die; (ii) will continue to work; or (iii) will become a 
pensioner6.  For the first probability, the paper assumes that the mortality rate of 
contributors is respectively the same as the population by age and sex in the life 
table, even though it is commonly recognized that participants of the social 
insurance scheme receive better healthcare treatment and other social 
services, which impact on survivorship via lower mortality rates and higher life 
expectancy than the average population. For the second and third cases, since 
early and late retirements are ignored in the projections, male and female 
contributors are assumed to be pensioners only when they reach 60 and 55 
years of age, respectively. 
 
To clarify the impact of demographic changes in all projections, however, 
the life table will be modified by an initial assumption that life expectancy at 
birth of both men and women will increase 5 years during the projection period. 
The results are expected to show how mortality rates and the age structure of 
the population affect the estimated size of pension liabilities.     
 
The growth rate of average wages (or average compensations) of both 
pre- and post-1995 contributors, which are used in calculating contributions to 
the pension scheme, are assumed to grow at the same rate (p). It is supposed 
that p is the same as the productivity growth rate, which is assumed to be 3 
percent for the whole projection period. In the sensitivity tests, this growth rate 
will be ±1 per cent difference. 
 
                  
6 As indicated in Plamondon et al. (2002), there are further probabilities that shape accounting 
practice, notably that contributors may become unemployed or re-enter the workforce. Their 
rights are obviously still valid in the scheme. Such cases, however, are difficult to estimate, 
particularly in the context of rapid labour mobility between economic sectors.  
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As indicated in Giang (2005), the benefit formula is varied for beneficiaries 
from different economic sectors, since they refer to different wage systems. This 
in turn makes the actual base wages, which are used to estimate pension 
wages, different. The dataset, however, does not include detailed information 
on the relation between average compensation and the average base wage 
of the contributors by age and sex; hence it will be assumed that average base 
wages are proportionate to average compensation at the time of retirement. In 
practice, the actual variance between these indicators has gradually reduced 
from about 15 percent in 1998 to 5.7 percent in 20027, and it is therefore 
assumed that the average base wage is about 90 percent of the average 
compensation at the time of retirement. In addition, the average replacement 
rates for male and female contributors at retirement ages in the base year will 
be employed (as would be appropriate with the assumption of no early or late 
retirement), and they are assumed to be unchanged during the projection 
period. Finally, adopting the same procedure used in projections for pre- and 
post-1995 pensioners, it is assumed that benefits for dependants and survivors of 
the pre- and post-1995 contributors are 10 percent of their total pension 
benefits. 
 
The discount rate (r) is the critical factor for determining the size of pension 
liabilities since a lower discount rate leads to greater present value of (net) 
pension liabilities, and vice versa. In the base case, it is assumed that the 
discount rate is the same as the wage growth rate. In sensitivity tests the 
discount rate will be examined with ±1 per cent difference from the wage 
growth rate. Moreover, this is also a crucial factor when considering amortization 
of pension liabilities, particularly in the context of a dynamically efficient 
economy. 
         
                  
7 These figures are respectively from Holzmann, Arthur, and Sinn (2000), and author’s estimation 
from VSI (2004).  
4. Estimated Results and Implications 
 
a. Results of the Base Case, and Sensitivity Tests 
 
The estimated results for the base case, which assumes that the discount 
rate is equal to the wage growth rate at 3 percent, are presented in Table 1. 
These estimates are also examined with ±1 percent difference of discount rate 
from the base case. 
 
Table 1. Estimated (Net) Pension Liabilities as Percentage of 2002 GDP 
Discount Rate Category 
2% 3% 4% 
Pre-1995 Pensioners 1.49 1.46 1.42 
Post-1995 Pensioners 1.82 1.75 1.70 
Pre-1995 Contributors 1.98 1.85 1.75 
Post-1995 Contributors 2.03 1.91 1.86 
Total 7.32 6.97 6.73 
Source: Author’s estimates 
 
This table shows that, in comparison with 2002 GDP, the total pension liability 
is small. This result can be explained by the fact that the PAYG pension scheme 
in Vietnam is young (it started in 1995), has a low coverage rate (about 12 
percent of the labor force in 2002), and that average labour compensation and 
pension payments are low. The result is also consistent with the findings of other 
studies, such as for El Salvador and Haiti (Bravo and Uthoff 1999). Another 
possible cause of this result is inherent in the closed-group approach, which limits 
the number of future contributors and pensioners.  
 
As expected, the generational accounts of both pre- and post-1995 
pensioners are positive, and the estimated total pension liability of these 
pensioners is about 3.2 percent of 2002 GDP. Both generational accounts of the 
current contributors are also positive, and their estimated net pension liability is 
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about 4 percent of 2002 GDP, meaning that they will also be positive 
beneficiaries in the future.  
 
In order to see how the size of pension liabilities is different from the base 
case, some scenarios may be tested. Results from Scenario 1, which assumes ±1 
per cent difference in wage growth rate from the base case, do not show 
significant differences. For example, with wage growth rate at 4 per cent and 2 
per cent, the estimated size of liabilities as a percentage of 2002 GDP is 6.89 per 
cent and 6.53 per cent, respectively. All generational accounts of the current 
pensioners and contributors are positive. Scenario 2, which uses the modified life 
table to discover the impacts of demographic variables, shows interesting 
findings:  the estimated total pension liability is 7.74 per cent of 2000 GDP, which 
is about 1 per cent higher than that of the base case. It is found that lower 
mortality rates for age cohorts have small impacts on the estimated size of 
pension liabilities since the number of pensioners and contributors does not 
change significantly in comparison with the base case. Conversely, the age 
distribution of both pensioners and contributors have a substantial influence on 
their respective pension liabilities, particularly for the group which has more 
people who are senior or reaching retirement ages. The latter finding can be 
explained partly by the assumption of no early or late retirement for current 
contributors. 
 
In all of these cases, intergenerational and intra-generational inequities are 
obvious since current workers (who are not participating in the pension scheme) 
and future workers will be losers in the “generational battles” as long as the 
government pays these liabilities via higher taxes.  It is, however, also apparent 
that the government must pay these liabilities in any case, so it remains 
important to find appropriate payment settings which ensure the government’s 
financial solvency. One way is to use the inter-temporal amortization approach, 
in which a government uses a constant tax rate (t) for the whole economy to 
finance pension liabilities (see Appendix 3). For instance, if we assume that the 
economic growth rate during the projection period is 5 per cent annually for the 
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base case, the government will have to tax about 0.05 per cent of GDP to 
finance pension liabilities.  
 
It is worth noting that, if the Vietnamese economy is dynamically efficient, 
or g < r, then the tax rate (t) will be greater, and thus both intergenerational and 
intra-generational inequity problems will become more severe. Higher 
economic growth is one possible source of mitigating the financial and 
generational problems of the pension scheme.  
 
b. Reducing the Size of Pension Liabilities 
 
Even though the above-mentioned tax is negligible in comparison with 
annual GDP, the question of generational inequity is unavoidable, since the 
burden will surely be shouldered by the current and future working population. 
Therefore, in order to mitigate these burdens, the following scenarios will be 
carefully considered. Note that these scenarios apply under the base case’s 
assumptions on discount and wage growth rates.  
 
• Scenario (i): Reduce replacement rates of both pre- and post-1995 
pensioners by 3 percent, and increase contribution rates of pre- and 
post-1995 also by 3 percent (to 18 percent), simultaneously from 2002. 
 
• Scenario (ii): In addition to (i), increase retirement age for both pre- 
and post-1995 female contributors from 55 to 60. 
 
• Scenario (iii): Keep the same benefit rates as for the current pensioners, 
and consider balancing contributions and benefits of current 
contributors (that is, reduce the estimated size of net pension liabilities 
of current contributors to zero). 
 
• Scenario (iv): Shift current contributors to a funded-type scheme. 
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The estimated results of these scenarios are presented in Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2. Summary of Estimated Results from Different Scenarios 
Scenario Total Pension Liabilities 
(as percentage of 2002 GDP) 
Tax Required* 
(as percentage of 2002 
GDP) 
Scenario (i) 5.12 0.034 
Scenario (ii) 4.43 0.030 
Scenario (iii) 3.21 0.021 
4.90  
- pensioners (3.21) 0.021 
 
Scenario (iv) 
- accrued rights to contributors 
(1.69) 
scheduled by notional 
accounts 
Note: (*) discount rate = wage growth rate = 3%, and economic growth rate = 5%. 
 
Source: Author’s estimates 
 
For Scenario (i): the estimated results show that total pension liabilities of all 
pre- and post-1995 pensioners and contributors, as percentage of 2002 GDP, 
would be reduced to 5.12 per cent from the level of 6.79 per cent in the base 
case. This means that the government would have to tax at a rate of about 
0.034 per cent of annual GDP during the period to finance these liabilities. In 
terms of intergenerational equity, the possible burdens on current and future 
working population are lower than the base case, even though they still have to 
bear some of the load (i.e. since the tax rate is positive). In terms of intra-
generational equity, however, this policy must take into account the fact that 
there are both poor and rich pensioners in the current scheme. Therefore, if 
possible, consideration needs to be given to cutting benefits of rich pensioners 
rather than a once-for-all reduction, as in Scenario (i). In addition, there is also a 
possibility that intra-generational inequity will exist among contributors, 
especially as younger contributors who have a longer service period may get 
lower benefit rates than older ones, particularly people reaching retirement age 
in 2002 when this Scenario begins. 
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For Scenario (ii): the total pension liabilities are lower than the scenario (i), 
at 4.43 per cent of 2002 GDP. The inter-temporal amortization approach shows, 
in this case, that the government will have to tax 0.03 percent of annual GDP to 
finance these pension liabilities, meaning that current and future working 
population will shoulder lower burdens than in Scenario (i). It is again, however, 
worth noting that both inter- and intra-generational inequity will exist, although 
the seriousness of differences will vary. For instance, young female contributors 
will have absolutely lower benefit rates than older ones, particularly females 
upon reaching the new retirement age. 
 
For Scenario (iii): the estimated size of pension liabilities to the scheme is the 
same as that for current pensioners, which is 3.21 per cent of 2002 GDP, and 
therefore the government needs to tax 0.021 per cent of annual GDP to finance 
the pension liabilities. It seems that this case is the most prospective one since 
the burden for taxpayers is the least. Nevertheless, to achieve this Scenario, an 
immediate increase (i.e. from the year 2002) in the contribution rate would be 
required of current contributors, from 15 per cent to about 24 per cent. The 
feasibility of this scenario depends much upon the contributors’ income profiles 
since a swift increase in contribution rate may put a significant number of 
contributors (who already have very low labour compensation) into poverty.  
 
For Scenario (iv): the estimated size of total pension liabilities is the same as 
the previous one, as measured by accrued-to-date approach (or PVCj1(2002) in 
equation (3)). This Scenario does not take into account possible future 
contributions and benefits of the current contributions. It is shown that the 
estimated size is 4.9 per cent of 2002 GDP, including 3.21 per cent for pre- and 
post-1995 pensioners, and 1.69 per cent for accrued-to-date liabilities of pre- 
and post-1995 contributors. For the former, the government can pay them by an 
inter-temporal schedule, i.e. a tax of 0.02 per cent annual GDP. For the latter, 
the accrued-to-date liabilities will only become explicit when contributors have 
their own accounts. To avoid immediate payments on these accounts, the 
government would adopt a schedule in which notional accounts are 
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established at the beginning, and payments of these liabilities are then 
scheduled up to the point at which contributors reach their retirement ages. This 
policy action of course requires careful estimates of macro-economic factors 
(Giang, 2004a). 
 
It is clear that, in any scenario, the government always faces pension 
liabilities and issues that normally arise in generational relations. It is difficult to 
conclude which policy option is the best since we have not taken into account 
a variety of factors influencing the economy in general, and the pension 
scheme in particular. However, given the four Scenarios presented, and 
considering both economic and equity viewpoints, the last scenario is 
preferable to the first three,  for the following reasons. First, current and future 
taxpayers are likely to bear lower burdens if the government uses their taxes to 
finance their pension liabilities. Second, shifting current contributors to a funded 
scheme with a careful schedule for payments of accrued-to-date pension 
liabilities will put a stop to the government’s need to make future promises -- 
promises which may, in turn, harm intergenerational relations and exacerbate 
inequities by placing higher tax burdens on the working population.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks    
          
This paper has aimed to measure the size of pension liabilities of the current 
PAYG DB pension scheme in Vietnam, and to focus on generational relations in 
economic terms. The resulting estimates indicate that liabilities are small in 
comparison with GDP in 2002, the base year used for projections. This can be 
explained partially by two most important factors, i.e. the estimation approach 
itself, and the scheme’s youth and the relatively low levels of coverage, 
compensation, and pensions that it proposes to pay. Sensitivity tests with 
different discount and wage growth rates show that the estimated liabilities are 
not significantly different from that of the base case. Analysis of demographic 
impacts implies that mortality rates will not have much influence on the 
estimated size of pension liabilities. The age structure of the population, 
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however, remains critical. Pension liabilities will, moreover, have different 
economic impacts on the several generations, and hence on generational 
relations. If the government chooses to pay these liabilities by imposing higher 
taxes, then current and future workers will have to shoulder them, making 
intergenerational inequity ineluctable. Changing this policy to reduce pension 
liabilities may also lead to intra-generational inequity, since younger contributors 
may receive less net benefits than the older ones. These generational inequities 
will be less severe if the economy is dynamically efficient, and therefore 
promoting economic growth is a possible way to deal with these problems. 
 
Needless to say, there are a number of limitations to this paper, owing 
mostly to reliance on static forecasting under heroic assumptions. As with other 
studies on this topic, which are subject to similar constraints, the estimates 
produced here are subject to differing degrees of uncertainty that are inherent 
in social and economic movements, and thus policy implications may be over- 
or understated. 
 
As an indicative study, however, this paper indicates that the current 
pension scheme in Vietnam needs to be reformed immediately to achieve both 
financial viability and generational balance8. Hesitation or postponement may 
lead to painful social and economic consequences consequent on never-
ending “generational battles”.           
    
 
                  
8 See Giang (2004b & 2005) for proposed reform of the pension scheme in Vietnam. 
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Appendix 1 
Summary of Data for Pensioners and Contributors, 2002 
 
Figure 1.1. Pre-1995 Pensioners by Age and Sex, 2002 
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Figure 1.2. Post-1995 Pensioners by Age and Sex, 2002 
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Figure 1.3. Pre-1995 Active Contributors by Age and Sex, 2002 
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Figure 1.4. Post-1995 Contributors by Age and Sex, 2002 
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Source: Author compiled and estimated from VSI (2004) 
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Appendix 2 
Life Table of the Vietnamese Population by Age Group and Sex, 1999 
 
Male Female 
Age 5mx 5qx lx e0x 5mx 5qx lx e0x 
0 0.0290 0.0283 100,000 64.65 0.0218 0.0214 100,000 68.64 
1 0.0029 0.0115 97,174 65.52 0.0026 0.0103 97,862 69.13 
5 0.0010 0.0052 96,052 62.27 0.0006 0.0032 96,856 65.84 
10 0.0008 0.0041 95,555 57.58 0.0005 0.0026 96,550 61.04 
15 0.0014 0.0068 95,159 52.81 0.0010 0.0048 96,298 56.19 
20 0.0018 0.0089 94,515 48.15 0.0013 0.0066 95,839 51.54 
25 0.0017 0.0087 93,679 43.56 0.0012 0.0062 95,209 46.77 
30 0.0024 0.0120 92,863 38.92 0.0015 0.0077 94,617 42.05 
35 0.0030 0.0149 91,749 34.36 0.0018 0.0090 93,892 37.35 
40 0.0042 0.0210 90,384 29.84 0.0027 0.0133 93,046 32.67 
45 0.0068 0.0333 88,487 25.43 0.0043 0.0215 91,807 28.08 
50 0.0112 0.0546 85,539 21.22 0.0073 0.0357 89,836 23.64 
55 0.0185 0.0884 80,871 17.30 0.0120 0.0581 86,626 19.42 
60 0.0316 0.1464 73,724 13.74 0.0215 0.1020 81,591 15.47 
65 0.0511 0.2265 62,928 10.66 0.0372 0.1700 73,265 11.94 
70 0.0827 0.3426 48,676 8.05 0.0671 0.2873 60,811 8.87 
75 0.1322 0.4968 32,000 5.95 0.1138 0.4429 43,338 6.44 
80 0.2039 0.6754 16,101 4.35 0.1881 0.6398 24,145 4.57 
85+ 0.3119 1 5,227 3.21 0.0370 1 8,698 3.26 
Note: 5mx is the central death rate for the age interval (x, x+5);  
                5qx is the probability of an individual at age x dying before the end of the age 
interval (x, x+5). 
          lx is the number of survivors at age x in a life table with starting population of 
100,000; and 
          e0x is life expectancy at age x. 
Source: Lopez et al. (2000) 
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Appendix 3 
Inter-temporal Amortization of Pension Liabilities 
 
This methodology is derived from Bravo and Uthoff (1999). Naturally, it 
assumes that annual payments of pension liabilities are a constant fraction of 
annual GDP (i.e. t), and that the tax rate is set annually by the government.  
Supposing that GDP (denoted by Y) grows at a constant rate of g, and r is 
the discount rate, the inter-temporal amortization in the number of payment 
periods (n) expresses the present value of pension liabilities (PL) as a function of 
Y, t, g, and r, as follows. 
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When a = 1, or i = g, we will have t = PL/Y1.  
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